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Philippe Van Parijs argues for a basic income for all legal residents of the European Union to be financed
by the Value Added Tax. Unlike the US, the EU lacks automatic inter-state transfers and
migration between states is much less common. A universal basic income would serve as a
buffering mechanism and enable a stronger recovery from economic downturns . It would also
help the Union overcome the pressures of competitiveness that entails a sacrificing of social
expenditure and the EU may be seen as more legitimate and less of a heartless bureaucracy
in the eyes of its residents.
Criticizing is easy. Making proposals is harder. Here is one, simple and radical, yet — I shall argue — reasonable
and urgent. Eurodividend is how I shall call it. It consists in paying a modest basic income to every legal resident of
the European Union, or at least of the subset of member states that either have adopted the euro or are committed to
doing so soon. This income provides each resident with a universal and unconditional floor that can be
supplemented at will by labour income, capital income and social benefits. Its level can vary from country to country
to track the cost of living, and it can be lower for the young and higher for the elderly. It is to be financed by the Value
Added Tax. To fund a eurodividend averaging 200 euros per month for all EU residents, one needs to tax the EU’s
harmonized VAT base at a rate of about 20%, which amounts to close to 10% of the EU’s GDP.
Why do we need such an unprecedented scheme? For four reasons. The most urgent one has to do with the crisis in
the Eurozone. Why is it that the US have been managing for many decennia with a single currency despite the
diversity of its fifty states and their divergent economic fates, whereas the Eurozone is in deep trouble after just one
decade? From Milton Friedman to Amartya Sen, economists have kept warning us: Europe lacks two buffering
mechanisms that serve in the US as powerful substitutes for exchange rate adjustments by individual states.
One of them is inter-state migration. The proportion of US residents who move to another state in any given period is
about six times higher than the proportion of EU residents who move to another member state. Europeans may
become somewhat more mobile. But our entrenched linguistic diversity imposes very strict limits on how far we can
expect — or indeed hope — to amplify this first mechanism. Athens’ unemployed will never migrate as smoothly to
Munich as Detroit’s to Austin.
The dollar zone’s second powerful buffering mechanism consists of automatic inter-state transfers, essentially
through the working of a welfare state largely organized and funded at the federal level. If Michigan or Missouri
suffer economically, they do not sink into a downward spiral. Not only is their unemployment tempered by
emigration. In addition, owing to tax liabilities shrinking and benefit payments swelling, a growing part of their social
expenditures is de facto funded by the rest of the country. Depending on the methodology used, the estimates of the
extent of this automatic compensation vary between 20 and 40%. In the EU, by contrast, the dampening of a
member’s state downturn through adjustments of net transfers across states amounts to less than 1%. Given the
poor prospects of the migration mechanism, the eurozone simply cannot afford to neglect this second one. What
form should it take? We shall not nor should ever have an EU-wide mega welfare state. Something more modest,
far rougher, more lump-sum and therefore more compatible with the EU’s subsidiarity principle, is what we need. If it
is to be viable, our monetary union needs to equip itself with a number of new tools. One of them is a buffering
mechanism which can only be something like a eurodividend.
The second reason why we need such a trans-national transfer scheme applies to the EU as a whole. The linguistic
and cultural diversity of the European continent does not only make inter-state migration more costly and therefore
less likely for the individuals involved. It also reduces the benefits and increases the costs for the communities
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involved. Integration into the new environment, both economic and social, takes more time, requires more
administrative and educational resources, creates more lasting tensions than is the case with inter-state migration in
the US. As migrants from poorer countries flock into the more affluent metropolitan areas, the feeling of being
invaded by indigestible crowds feeds the drive to reinstate thick boundaries and repudiate both free movement and
non-discrimination. There is an alternative, however: organize systematic transfers from the centre to the periphery.
People will no longer need to be uprooted and driven away from their relatives and communities by the sheer need
to survive. Instead, populations will be sufficiently stabilized to make immigration digestible in the magnet areas and
to stop emigration being badly debilitating in the peripheral areas. If it is to be politically sustainable and socio-
economically efficient, a European Union with free internal migration must introduce something along the lines of a
eurodividend.
Thirdly and most fundamentally, the free movement of capital, human capital, goods and services across the borders
of member states erodes the capacity of each of these to perform the redistributive tasks they discharged pretty well
in the past. Member states are no longer sovereign states able to set democratically their priorities and to realize
solidarity among their citizens. They are more and more compelled to behave as if they were firms, obsessed by
their competitiveness, anxious to attract or keep their capital and their human capital, eager to eradicate any social
expenditure that cannot be sold as an investment and to phase out any scheme likely to attract welfare tourists and
other unproductive folk. It is no longer democracy that imposes its rules on markets and uses them for its purposes.
It is the single market that imposes its laws on democracies and forces them to give competitiveness top priority. If
our diverse ways of organizing social solidarity are to be saved from the grip of fiscal and social competition, part of it
must be lifted to a higher level. The power and diversity of our welfare states will not survive the murderous pressure
of competitiveness unless the united European market operates on the foundation of something like a Eurodividend.
Finally, it is important for all dimensions of the functioning of the European Union that its decisions should be
regarded as legitimate, so that governments and citizens will not feel entitled to circumvent them in all sorts of ways.
One important factor turns on whether citizens perceive very tangibly that the Union does something for all of them,
not only for the elites, for the movers, for those who are in a position to seize the new opportunities, but also for the
underdogs, for those left out, for the stay-at-homes. Bismarck helped secure the shaky legitimacy of his unified
Germany by creating the world’s first public pension system. If the Union is to be more in people’s eyes than a
heartless bureaucracy, if it is to be perceived as a caring Europe with which all can identify, it will need to find a way
of bringing about something totally unprecedented: a universal eurodividend.
Are there any reasonable objections to this proposal? Of course there are. Some, for example, may question the
wisdom using VAT to fund the scheme. True, VAT is the most Europeanized of all major forms of taxation. But would
it not make more sense to use a Tobin tax or a carbon tax, for example? We can do so, but what these taxes could
fund, under pretty optimistic assumptions, is an EU-wide monthly eurodividend of no more than 10 and 14 euros,
respectively. Why not the more progressive personal income tax then? Because the definition of the income tax base
varies greatly from country to country and is highly sensitive politically. Moreover, today’s income tax is de facto
hardly more progressive than VAT. When added to national rates, would a 20% rate of VAT not be unsustainable? It
does not need to be added to unchanged VAT rates: the member states’ social expenditures can and should be
adjusted downward and the revenues of the income tax upward as a straightforward implication of the sheer
presence of the eurodividend.
Others are likely to object that each of the four functions listed above could be served better through some more
complicated, more sophisticated device. Most of these arguments will be correct. My claim is simply that no other
manageable mechanism would serve all four functions as well while being intelligible to the ordinary European
citizen.
A more fundamental objection is that, however desirable the expected effects, it would be unfair to give everyone
something for nothing. This objection rests on a misperception. A eurodividend does not amount to an unfair
redistribution of the fruits of some hard workers’ work. It rather amounts to sharing among all European residents, in
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the form of a modest basic income, part of the benefits of European integration. How much did we save as a result of
not having to conduct or prepare war with our neighbours? How much did we gain as a result of having increased
competition between our firms or of having allowed factors of production to move wherever in Europe they are most
productive? No one knows and no one will ever know. But what is certain is that these benefits are distributed very
unequally in the European population, depending on whether they are movers or stay-at-homes, depending on
whether or not the situation created by European integration happened to make their consumption cheaper or their
skills more valuable. A modest eurodividend is simply a straightforward and efficient way of guaranteeing that some
of these benefits will reach each European in a tangible way.
Is this not utopian? Of course it is, in the sense in which the European Union itself was utopian until not so long ago,
and also in the sense in which the social security system was utopian before Bismarck put together its first building
blocks. But Bismarck did not create his pension system out of the kindness of his heart. He did so because people
started mobilizing in favour of radical reforms across the whole of the Reich he was trying to unify. What are we
waiting for?
Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of the British Politics and Policy blog, nor of the
London School of Economics. Please read our comments policy before posting.
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